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This paper is a revisiting of the question of contemporary Islamism in Egypt.
Its purpose is to rethink the main arguments and explanatory frameworks re-
lating to Islamist activism in general and the militant and violent type in par-
ticular. It presents some new propositions about the phenomenon and provides
elements for a deeper understanding. This revisiting is undertaken in light of
certain developments over the last decade or so, which may be summarised as
follows: 1) the heightening of Islamist violence, marked by confrontations with
the government in and around Cairo and in the provinces of Upper Egypt1; 2)
the emergence of clear socio-spatial dimensions to Islamist activism. For the
purposes of this article, my analysis pertains to these developments in the
greater Cairo area.2
The paper is guided by several interrelated aims, some of which are given
only preliminary attention here. First, it points to the links between Islamist 
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action, on one hand, and a particular social geography of the city and the his-
torical modes of urban organisation, on the other. Here, I draw attention to the
history of urban activism in the popular quarters of the city, underlining the role
of popular classes in politics, the grounding of their activism in the social struc-
tures of the neighbourhoods and their patterns of organisation. Second, it out-
lines certain characteristics of the present urban context; specifically the infor-
mal housing communities and the social landscape characterising them. The
argument here is that Islamism has found a home in these communities because
their spatial, social, cultural, and economic characteristics have contributed to
their emergence as “spheres of dissidence.”3 Third, it examines the Islamist
modes of implantation and action and the ways in which these are interwoven
with the space, as exemplified by the informal housing communities of Ain
Shams and Imbaba in greater Cairo. Fourth, it highlights the importance of cer-
tain contemporary Islamist practices, which recall earlier forms of social or-
ganisation and regulation. Fifth, it situates Islamist activism within an overall
framework, which takes into account the variables outlined above in addition
to the role of ideological practices in mobilising support. In this regard, I will
underline the limits to mobilisation which arise out of the Islamists’ articula-
tion of the principle of “enjoining good and forbidding evil.”
The central argument is that militant Islamism has developed as an appro-
priation of spaces that have emerged in the ongoing processes of urban growth
and expansion. There are indications that the new landscape does not represent
rupture with social traditions and popular modes of life, but is, rather, a varia-
tion on the historically evolving urban tapestry. In socio-spatial terms, the Is-
lamists are “of” the popular classes, diverging from them only in some of their
radical ideological practices.
The paper is divided into five sections. Section one highlights certain elements
in the explanatory frameworks used in relation to militant Islamism. Section two
provides a brief historical overview of Cairo’s urban social organisation. Section
three sketches the new popular neighbourhoods, drawing a composite image of
their social space. Section four outlines the Islamist mode of implantation in the
new quarters. Section five highlights the popular movement dimensions of Is-
lamist activism and the limitations of their ideological practices in the new quar-
ters. The conclusion attempts to draw out the case for and against the develop-
ment of militant Islamism as a full-fledged movement of the popular classes.
a brief overview of contemporary islamism 
as a contestation movement
Militant Islamism is conventionally associated, at the ideological level, with
Egyptian radical thinker Sayyid Qutb, and at the level of practice, with the 1970s
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groups influenced by his ideas. Among the earliest of these groups were al-
Fanniya al-Askariya (the Technical Military Academy) and al-Takfir wa al-Hijra
(Excommunication and Flight), while the later ones, which continue to be active
to this date, are al-Jihad Organisation and al-JamaÄa al-Islamiya (the Islamic
Group).4 These groups share what is commonly referred to as a “Jihadist” ide-
ology. The main tenets of this ideology revolve around the idea of restoring
hakimiyya (God’s governance) and the evaluative assessment of present-day
society as jahiliyya (the state of ignorance before the advent of Islam). The con-
cept of jihad (struggle) is central to their militant ideology, serving to justify
the use of violence as a mode of action against state and society. The purpose
of jihad is to establish the Islamic state and apply the shariÄa.5 These two ob-
jectives are shared with moderate Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brother-
hood Organisation.
Studies of these militant groups and their ideologies have generated typolo-
gies of organizations and individuals in their attempts to explain the nature of
the movement and provide a framework for understanding. It is not my inten-
tion here to review the now immense volume of literature on the topic.6 Rather,
I will briefly recall the main contours of two key approaches in the literature on
this subject. The first takes Islam as a starting point, and bases itself on the his-
tory of Islamic ideas. Through this prism, the movements appear as an expres-
sion of unchanging principles which guide the believers; hence their fundamen-
talism.7 This corresponds to the revival thesis advanced by Sivan and others.
Within this same approach, a more nuanced view is given in the reform thesis,
which sees in Islamism the articulation of the religion’s inherent, transformative
potential.8 The approach as a whole tends to attribute continuity to Islamic ideas
and thought, and posits them as the embodiment of some religious essence.
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Modern Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), and P.J. Vatikiotis, Islam and the State
(London: Croom Helm, 1987), particularly chapter three.
8 See R.H. Dekmejian, “Islamic Revival, Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences,” in The Pol-
itics of Islamic Revivalism, ed. Shireen Hunter (Bloomington: Indianna University Press, 1988), 3–
22, and John O. Voll, “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah,” in Voices of
Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 32–47.
The second approach is best described as the psychosocial model. Its ear-
liest expression is found in studies of the socioeconomic background of the
first generation of militant Islamists, who emerged on the scene in the 1970s.9
The model has yielded a socio-psychological profile of the ideal militant type:
a recent migrant to the city, highly educated, a disenchanted product of mod-
ernisation. This perspective described the relationship between the movement
and its context as being based on factors such as social dislocation and alien-
ation. Within this conceptual framework the Islamists represent a rejection of
their social environment. They occupy a vanguard role by virtue of their dis-
tinction from the rest of society. This approach’s emphasis on Islamists’ elit-
ist ideology and high level of educational achievement leads to a downplay-
ing of the movement’s popular dimensions. In this vein, Hamied Ansari
affirmed:
The militant view is confined to a segment of the population on the margin of society.
It has no impact on the urban masses or traditional rural society. Islamic militancy is es-
pecially appealing to the young men or to the rural migrants who became caught in the
web of an urban society whose most manifest feature is the unbridled consumerism re-
sulting from the liberalization policy initiated by Sadat. To this segment of the popula-
tion which is experiencing an acute sense of deprivation, the resort to Islam was more a
sign of social protest than a way of life.10
In a more recent study, Saad Eddine Ibrahim noted changes in the social pro-
file of the membership of Islamist groups: a decline in the percentage of uni-
versity students active in militant groups, and an increase in the share of what
he terms the lower middle class.11 Further, Ibrahim has included the “alienat-
ed masses” among those who suffer from relative deprivation. Although
Ibrahim has adjusted the profile, the explanatory framework of the psychoso-
cial approach remains intact. There are problems with this conceptual appara-
tus. First, it views the people as divorced from their social setting or, at least,
psychologically removed from it. Thus, it leaves out both the efforts of the dis-
affected to create an alternative set of living conditions, and their engagement
in the production of that environment. Second, the greater emphasis on psy-
chological factors attracts attention away from the structures of social action
which emerge in everyday life, and from those structures which can be recalled
as acts of historical retrieval and remembering. As a result of these conceptual
restrictions, we lose sight of the spaces of protest and the structures of opposi-
tional action in which the people operate; by extension, we do not see in what
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ways and under what terms the Islamist insertion into the popular spaces has
occurred.
A number of studies have, however, paid attention to the issue of popular ac-
tivism. Situating the Islamist challenge within a wider historical context, Afaf
Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot analyzes contemporary Islamism as an urban protest
movement.12 Al-Sayyid-Marsot shows how Islamic groups represent a type of
collective action which involves popular mobilisation, and describes how this
type of action is rooted in the changing dynamics of state-society relations in
Egypt. These changes took place in the structures of mediation, whereby the
role of the ulama (learned men of religion) as intermediaries and popular lead-
ers was “devolved on new socially mobilised groups.”13 Similarly, Guilain De-
noeux recognised the importance of Islamic urban networks in the mobilisation
of opposition against the state.14 However, in conceptual terms Denoeux alter-
nates between the two approaches outlined above. In line with Saad Eddine
Ibrahim, he emphasises that the ideological principles of the Islamist groups re-
sponded to the needs of uprooted, alienated, educated youths.15 At the same
time, drawing on Emmanuel Sivan, he argues that the groups are a contempo-
rary manifestation of the original founding experience of Islam, i.e., the hijra
model (the flight of the prophet and the believers from Mecca to Medina).16
The approach developed in this article stresses the importance of socio-
spatial factors in analysing contemporary Islamism and in exploring the popu-
lar movement dimension of Islamist militant action. In other words, the study
seeks to explore how the Islamists anchor themselves in certain spaces. One im-
portant aspect of my analysis is the study of the historical dimension of urban
activism, in which activists draw on earlier experience and show where conti-
nuities and breaks occur. The attention given to space nuances the similarities
and differences encountered in the urban landscape, both historically and in the
contemporary period. This points to the need for comparative studies of old
quarters in their evolution and in relation to the new popular quarters, includ-
ing informal housing communities. As will be apparent from the analysis be-
low, some characteristics of the old quarters and their social modes of organi-
sation have persisted to the present. In addition, these have been transported to
the new quarters and, in the process, have been reinvented and transformed. The
comparative historical view helps locate contemporary Islamism within the de-
veloping socio-spatial configuration of the city. The approach I am proposing
proceeds in a similar vein to the study of “comparative history of urban collec-
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13 Ibid., 55
14 Guilain Denoeux, “Religious Networks and Urban Unrest: Lessons from Iranian and Egypt-
ian Experiences,” in The Violence Within: Cultural and Political Opposition in Divided Nations,
ed. Kay B. Warren (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 123–55.
15 Ibid., 137. 16 Ibid., 145.
tive action” outlined by Edmund Burke III.17 Such a study is focused on the
evolving patterns and forms of urban contestation, and on tracing the links be-
tween the changes in these forms, on the one hand, and the processes of social
transformation, on the other.18
popular forces and power relations in the cairo urban
setting: a brief historical overview
A central aim of this paper is to bring into focus the analysis of societal forms
of organisation in explaining modes of contestation, including militant Is-
lamism. The anchoring of Islamist forces in particular urban spaces with dis-
tinct characteristics can help account for the nature of their organisation and
their patterns of action. Greater insights can be gained by situating this process
within an historical context, in which specific groups acted as forces of con-
testation and stimulated urban unrest in various Middle Eastern countries and
historical periods.19 This is not to argue that the contemporary Islamists are an
extension of these earlier forces, but to draw out the importance of certain forms
of social organisation which are reproduced or transformed over time, high-
lighting continuities as well as ruptures. This constitutes an element of a wider
framework which can illuminate our understanding of one of the most impor-
tant forces of contestation today: militant Islamism.
A starting point for reviewing city organisation in the Ottoman period (six-
teenth to nineteenth centuries) is its subdivision into quarters, with territorial, 
social, and political boundaries.20 The basis of this division was residential, 
professional, and religious. In the popular quarters of Cairo, professional com-
munities organised along craft lines, known as guilds, were juxtaposed to resi-
dential neighbourhoods. Superimposed on this framework was a religious type
of organisation (primarily the sufi orders). The whole formed a complex urban
network characterised by the overlapping of residential, professional, and com-
munal affiliations, parts of an overall system of power and control with many
layers. This same feature facilitated mobilisation of popular groups in times of
368 salwa ismail
17 Edmond Burke III, “Towards a History of Urban Collective action in the Middle East: Con-
tinuities and Change, 1750–1980,” in État, ville et mouvements sociaux au Maghreb et au Moyen-
Orient, eds. Kenneth Brown et al. (Paris: L’Harmmattan, 1989), 42–56.
18 Ibid., 44.
19 For a critical introduction to the literature on urban organisation, see R. Stephen Humphreys,
Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), chapter ten. See also
Masahi Haneda and Toru Miura eds., Islamic Urban Studies: Historical Review and Perspectives
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crises.21 As André Raymond notes, “. . . the inscription of the political and 
social forces in the geography of the city . . . was a fundamental phenome-
non.”22
The guilds were more than mere economic units; they had rules and struc-
tures of a social and political nature, with their heads (shaykhs) being chosen
by the membership and confirmed by the wali (governor). The shaykh was in
charge of collecting taxes, overseeing rules of apprenticeship, and maintaining
order.23 In addition, some shaykhs were heads of sufi orders based in the quar-
ters. An added dimension was the presence of organised youths or gangs with
links to these orders. Their names varied from the pejorative Äayyarun and zuÄr,
to the more positive, such as futuwwa.24
How did all of this fit into the system of social and political control? In prin-
ciple, the quarters were headed by a shaykh al-hara, who was the representa-
tive of the city governor and acted as an informant to authority. Other state
agents included the muhtasib, who oversaw pricing in the market and the
preservation of public morality. Another layer of state-society mediation and
control was occupied by the official Äulama.25
The positioning of the futuwwah, shaykh al-hara, muhtasib,Äalim, and sufi
leader was not static. The local groups extended their powers over their quar-
ters when the central administration was weak.26 Popular forces, particularly
the zuÄr, rose in contestation at different periods and for various reasons. They
also constituted a force to be mobilised by different contenders for power, in-
cluding the state itself. During the Ottoman period, Raymond notes, govern-
ments sometimes sought their help, but more often looked upon them with 
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22 Ibid., 263.
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of Modern Egypt (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 149–60. For a more nuanced
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24 Sawsan El-Messiri, “The Changing Role of the Futuwwa in the Social Structure of Cairo,” in
Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, eds. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London:
Duckworth, 1977), 239–53. On these groups in Cairo and Aleppo see Raymond, “Urban Net-
works.” On the zuÄr in Damascus see Miura Toru, “The Structure of the Quarter and the Role of the
Outlaws: The Salihiya Quarter and the ZuÄr Movement in Mamluk Period” in The Proceedings of
the International Conference on Urbanism in Islam (ICUTT) vol. 3 (Tokyo: The Middle East Cul-
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25 Afaf Loutfi El-Sayed, “The Role of the ulama in Egypt during the Nineteenth Century,” in
Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt, ed. P.M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press,
1968), 264–80.
26 Janet Abu Lughod, “The Islamic City-Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary
Relevance,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19 (1987): 155–76.
suspicion.27 The futuwwa gangs played an important role in mobilising the 
population of the quarters in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is these
groups which responded to the wali’s oppression, and which were mobilised
under the leadership of the craft-sufi heads and other religious figures.28 Ray-
mond affirms the gangs’ role in making history through their collective power
against the ruler. The threat to unleash gangs to loot and plunder forced rulers
to retract from imposing higher taxes or raising prices. In a sense, the gangs pre-
served the moral economy of the city.29 In time, these popular groups became
preliminary forces for contestation of and opposition to the French occupation
(1798–1801), and were instrumental in the investiture of the country’s leader-
ship in the person of Muhammad Ali.30
After a strong central administration was put in place under Muhammad Ali
in the nineteenth century, the political power of these forces waned, only to be
reasserted at critical junctures.31 In any case, the terms of social control and lo-
cal practices of power persisted. For example, the futuwwa-Äalim coalition of
the past was no longer operative, but, the futuwwa continued to influence the
life of the quarter.32 Thus, while overt popular contestation was contained by
an emerging strong state, socio-spatial factors allowed for continued autonomy
and other forms of activism.
Here, we should turn to the social organisation of the quarters.33 Janet Abu
Lughod stresses that within the terms of social and political organisation
sketched above, the quarter acted as protector and constituted “defensible
space.”34 This aspect of the quarter’s character developed as a consequence of
spatial and social organisation: spatial markers indicated where the public space
ended and semi-private and private spaces began. At the hara (alley/neigh-
bourhood) level, this spatial differentiation was expressed in a street system
which included a central branch or street (darb), from which small alleys or
passages called Äatfa branched into a zuqaq (dead-end alley).35 The hierarchi-
cal street system allowed for the maintenance of social autonomy and enforce-
ment of social rules regarding gender relations.
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28 Ibid.
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33 Abu Lughod, “The Islamic City.” 34 Ibid.
35 Nawal al-Messiri-Nadim, “The Concept of the Hara: A Historical and Sociological Study of
al-Sukkariya,” Annales Islamologiques 15 (1979): 313–48.
As a social unit the hara has persisted in the popular traditional quarters of the
city, along with many of the rules and regulations which made the local neigh-
bourhood operate as an extension of the family. In the twentieth-century context
of rapid social transformation, which brought about new economic, social, and
cultural developments for the popular classes to contend with, the old social
practices grounded in space were reworked. Regulation of male-female relations
and efforts to cope with new financial burdens of education and marriage were
issues to be dealt with within the historically developed modes of socio-spatial
interaction. Recent studies have shown us how this is accomplished36 and how
the quarters, centred on alleys, continue to represent the everyday communities
of the people, although the hara was officially abolished as an administrative unit
and the office of shaykh discarded in 1962.37 The hara continues to exist as a so-
cial and territorial unit in the old quarters and, to a lesser extent, in other parts
of the city. At the same time, the hara has undergone many changes. For exam-
ple, Stauth notes that the integrative functions of hara social relations and insti-
tutions began to weaken with the introduction of factory relations into the work-
shop production of the quarters.38As a result, the normatively grounded attitudes
of reciprocity, arbitration and sexual segregation, which represent important
rules in the construction of social and public life, required renegotiation.39 The
modes of survival and transformation of the old popular quarters are instructive
for our understanding of the new popular neighbourhoods.
In the post-1952 period, new residential and housing areas for the popular
classes have sprung up through state planning and community efforts. These ar-
eas differ from the old popular quarters in terms of street layout and residential
organisation. Those areas which emerged as a result of state planning were
mainly large industrial zones with popular housing units (masakin shaÄbiya) in
the form of low-income apartment blocks for workers in the Cairo suburbs of
Helwan and Shubra. State-planned residential areas were laid out along class
lines, with middle class suburbs designed for the professional elites forming 
the social base of the new regime.40 In the new working class areas, traditional
layers of control and mediation disappeared, and in their place there emerged
a system of surveillance centred around police stations—control of workers
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39 Ibid.
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was a preoccupation of the regime.41 These areas have been the sites of work-
ers’ protest, erupting from factories and perhaps drawing on the surrounding
housing areas where family and kin reside. The industrial zones, though orig-
inally planned by the state, have also become sites for informal housing com-
munities. Since the 1960s, this type of community began to spread to the 
outskirts of the city, and, today, such areas house one third of Cairo’s popula-
tion and have emerged as the new popular quarters. It is to these communities
that I now turn.
the new popular quarters and the islamist 
oppositional movements
Before proceeding to an examination of the key features of contemporary ur-
ban social organisation, I would like to note the particularities of the Islamist
presence in the urban setting. An investigation into the areas where Islamist ac-
tivism and confrontation with the government has occurred reveals a concen-
tration in popular neighbourhoods and quarters—namely, those areas which
have emerged “spontaneously” and have come to be known as informal hous-
ing communities. These have mainly developed on the periphery of greater
Cairo (Cairo, Giza and Qalyubiya) as well as in nine other Egyptian gover-
norates. Islamist implantation in these areas is discussed in greater detail be-
low. At this point, however, we should map the evolution of this presence over
the last two decades.
The importance of spatial determinants is indicated by al-Takfir wa al-
Hijra’s group strategy of separation by segregation in the peripheral areas of
southern Cairo. The group’s flight from the inner city was ideologically justi-
fied in terms of hijra, modelled after the migration of the Prophet from Mec-
ca to Medina. This tenet was not espoused by the Jihad group, but many of its
members lived and operated in peripheral areas such as Boulaq al-Dakrur,
Matariya and Sahil, forming cells headed by emirs, as in the Nahya district of
Imbaba.42 In fact, the places of residence in the early 1990s of members of the
new military section of the reconstituted Jihad (known as TalaiÄ al-Fatih or
Vanguard of Conquest) confirm a particular pattern of spatial distribution. This
pattern also crystallised in other groups from the mid-1980s on. First, we find
new groups emerging in these spaces, notably al-Najun min al-Nar (Escapees
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from Hell), and al-Samawiya (named after its leader Taha al-Samawi), whose
members resided in Boulaq, Matariya, and Imbaba. Then, a clear case of ter-
ritorialisation develops, with full-fledged efforts at appropriating the periph-
eral spaces. The informal housing communities, therefore, served not only as
places of residence and hiding, but also as areas of militant concentration and
activity.43
We should now turn to the new urban popular quarters and examine their spa-
tial features and socioeconomic configuration. This is necessary in order to shed
light on contemporary Islamism as a form of contestation shaped by the setting
in which it operates.
The establishment of informal housing settlements and the practice of squat-
ting on public land in Cairo are not, in themselves, new phenomena.44 However,
the large-scale development of informal housing communities is a more recent
occurrence, dating from the mid-1960s. In simple terms, these communities
arose in response to the increased popular need for urban housing and the state’s
failure to meet that need.45 Population growth, dislocation and resettlement and
rural-urban migration were all factors contributing to urban expansion. State
urban housing and planning did not keep up with this expansion. The state be-
gan providing fewer subsidised rental units in the mid 1960s, and by the early
1970s had moved into the production of medium-cost and luxury flats for pri-
vate ownership. As a result, responsibility for much urban management and
housing provision was assumed by the people themselves. In Cairo, this trans-
lated into the appropriation of public land and illegal construction on agricul-
tural land. The process of informal housing development has, thus far, resulted
in the emergence of seventy-four informal settlements in twelve areas of the
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city.46 The housing in these areas ranges from temporary shelter made of tin
huts and shacks to permanent structures several stories high.47
Informal housing communities have developed as spaces of urban contesta-
tion and have come to represent an important arena of Islamist activism. The
anchoring of Islamist groups in these communities must be understood in terms
of the physical characteristics of the spaces and the forms of social organisa-
tion which are inscribed in them. In spatial terms, these communities exist on
the periphery of the city and are not easily accessible—given that their rise was
not part of state planning, they cannot be accessed via paved roads and have no
means of public transportation. Some are also rather forbidding to outsiders,
due to a rocky landscape or otherwise inhospitable environment. As the max-
imisation of housing space is a valued objective in the development of these
communities, streets tend to be narrow with little public space and buildings
running back to back and side by side for kilometres, as is the case of Munira
in Imbaba.48 The high population density makes control and surveillance diffi-
cult. The narrow streets, unpaved roads, and labyrinthian layout render the ar-
eas uncharted territory for outsiders, including the state authority. In fact, until
recently, the agents of state control—particularly the police—were absent from
most of these spaces.
As communal efforts undertaken to resolve the housing problem, the infor-
mal communities have arisen in violation of government rules and regulations
concerning construction. This process of development has given the communi-
ties a certain degree of autonomy from the government—the latter having been
completely absent during the communities’ founding stages of planning and
construction. Unable and unwilling to meet popular housing needs, the state
turned a blind eye to the informal housing communities.
Community solidarity and forms of collective action have developed through
the process of implantation. Forms of social organisation and community con-
trol differ according to the history of development—whether communal or
managed by contractors. Where squatting on public land was collective and in
defiance of the state, the communities have organised along lines such as kin-
ship, place of origin, and date or period of arrival. As a consequence, in places
like Izbat al-Haganna in Madinat Nasr, Manshiyat Nasir in the Muqattam and
Istabl Antar in Fustat Hill, a power hierarchy has emerged with modes of con-
trol based on these various lines of social differentiation. This pattern is less
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likely to develop where contractors control the process of implantation, divid-
ing the plots and putting up illegal private construction. This latter type of di-
vision is found in Munira al-Gharabiya in Imbaba. However, even in Imbaba a
communal type of implantation has taken place in sections such as Izbat al-
SaÄyada, whose inhabitants migrated from Upper Egypt following the initial
settlement of a single individual and his family.
Studies of the informal housing communities reveal a mode of action and re-
lationship to government which reflect activism and initiative.49 The residents
pursue strategies of engagement and disengagement with the government de-
pending on their needs, employing tactics which bring about either visibility or
invisibility, to suit their situation. Residents of the communities organise and en-
gage in collective action to pressure the government to provide services, confer
legal status on them, and acknowledge their legitimate right to continue to live
in the spaces they have appropriated. In other instances, the residents choose to
meet their needs through private means, by collectively investing in the provi-
sion of services: purchasing cables and transformers for the connection of wa-
ter and electricity, paying for sewage tanks and the removal of solid waste.
The social groups residing in informal housing communities make up the ex-
panded popular classes. These are the social forces that developed with the
growth of commercial and service sectors of the economy under the policies of
infitah (open door) and privatisation, and with the accompanying restructuring
of the labour force.50 “Popular” is defined in opposition to the dominant
forces—the political and economic elites. It also refers to the economic and so-
cial position of a number of classes or fractions of classes which, because of the
blurring of boundaries, are not easily distinguishable. The fluidity and blurring
of lines has to do with occupational mobility and the fact that members of these
classes hold more than one job simultaneously. A common feature between
them, however, is the predominance of informal economic activities. This 
applies to the artisans, petty traders, low-level service sector workers, con-
struction workers, and craftsmen. Many of these workers are grouped under the
category of hirafiyyin (craftsmen or tradesmen). Levels of skill vary and so do
positions within the craft, from the self-employed and workshop owners, to
contractual workers, to daily workers. Informal economic activity signals a
change both in the structure of work and the social organisation which accom-
panied the move to new quarters.
Before proceeding to discuss other characteristics of the popular classes, it
is important to reflect on the working classes’ position as one of their constitu-
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tive components. In looking at the Egyptian setting we find that there is a need
to nuance the terms of this inclusion. First, the construction of masakin shaÄbiya
(popular housing) in housing areas designated for state workers allowed for
working class concentration in distinct districts and neighbourhoods of the city.
Second, the patterns of working class activism are inscribed within state cor-
poratist structures which were put in place by the Nasser regime after the 1952
revolution. Thus, working class forms of contestation are framed by terms of
negotiation and exchange that have been worked out with state-controlled
unions. These factors have served to distinguish the working class in terms of
residential distribution, relations with the government, and everyday forms of
social organisation. I will come back to the question of the apparent absence 
of Islamist mobilisation among the working class.
There is a residential aspect to the identification of the popular classes. Un-
til recently, the category referred to residents of the old quarters. It would seem
appropriate now to include the new neighbourhoods. The latter are distin-
guished in a number of ways. They are mainly inhabited by young “nuclear
families” that have come from the villages or have moved from the old quar-
ters, leaving their extended families behind. The physical characteristics of the
new neighbourhoods are different from the old, but, as Singerman points out,
the popular classes “take the hara culture with them.”51 Thus, the popular class-
es are also distinguishable from other social strata in cultural terms. This has to
do with the people’s claim to authenticity. Values, norms, and practices associ-
ated with the popular classes are seen as true and authentic and opposed to the
“fake” values and lifestyles of the upper classes. The socio-spatial factors out-
lined so far are important to the constitution of the popular classes as a politi-
cal force.
A study of Manshiyat Nasir shows the predominance of trades work among
the residents. Most of these tradespeople work in the informal sector.52 This
type of work composition is also reported in a study of Izbat al-Hagana.53 A re-
port commissioned by the governorate of Giza lists fifty percent of the residents
of informal communities as peddlers, daily workers and craftsmen.54 In the cur-
rent socioeconomic juncture of economic liberalisation and privatisation, the
employment ranks of the informal sector are expanding, due to the convergence
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of different types of entrants. On one hand, we find individuals with lower levels
of education and limited skills and, on the other, university graduates. In fact,
Hoodfar’s study of households in one of the new neighbourhoods shows that,
increasingly, young males are leaving school at an early age to learn a craft.
This represents a family-based response to changes in the job market, whereby
a higher education neither improves job opportunities nor brings higher in-
come.55 A similar pattern is revealed in a 1989 study of Munira al-Gharbiya in
Imbaba, showing a high rate of illiteracy among children over ten years old
(forty-nine percent). The study reports that twenty-one percent of children un-
der the age of fifteen have entered the labour force and that thirty-five percent
of the total number of children in the households surveyed are engaged in craft-
type employment.56 The entry into the artisan/tradesworker class by the edu-
cated segments of society is another development. Many of today’s construc-
tion sector workers, such as house painters, plasterers, and tile layers, are
university graduates with engineering and law degrees. Indeed, these degree-
holders find themselves among the group of arzuqi workers (daily job-seekers)
who bide their time in coffee shop cum labour markets, waiting for employ-
ment.57
Networks based on kinship and regional origin are avenues of entry into the
job market for the residents of the informal housing areas. In Manshiya Nasir,
individual kin groups enjoy links to particular trades. Thus, those originating
from the Araba, in the Upper Egypt province of Sohag, have better access to
the building trades and to such jobs as house painting and plastering.58 In Man-
shiya, the residents supply twenty percent of the labour force employed in the
workshops and stores of the area.59 The social networks of the Manshiyat res-
idents extend beyond the place of origin and the borders of the community to
include other quarters of the city. In fact, Tekçe, Oldham and Shorter contend
that “the patterns of interaction are becoming similar to those of the older ur-
ban neighbourhoods.”60 In her study of Izbat al-Hagana in Madinat Nasr, al-
Maghazi confirms the importance of familial and neighbourhood networks 
to the social interaction and economic activity of the residents, many of whom
establish workshops or small stores in the community. The informal labour 
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market is, in many ways, self-regulating. Its structures and regulatory institu-
tions operate in a manner similar to the guild system, with rules of entry, ap-
prenticeship and forms of solidarity and sociality which are now centred on cof-
fee shops rather than workshops.61
The commercial life of the neighbourhoods revolves around the market run-
ning through the main thoroughfare, where shops and kiosks are located. There
is little space for cars to pass through. Informality is once again the predomi-
nant character of these markets. However, they have their shaykhs, who act as
mediators with government, or organise the trade of particular goods.62 The in-
formal markets are also sites of confrontation with the police, whenever this lat-
ter tries, from time to time, to impose “law and order.”
The above composite portrait of informal housing communities highlights the
characteristics of the new popular neighbourhoods. This is a first step towards in-
tegrating them into the analysis of contemporary social and political activism in
Egypt (the informal communities have been the subject of anthropological and
sociological studies, but there has been little attempt to incorporate them into poli-
tical studies). On one hand, the informal housing communities appear to repre-
sent marginality and invisibility, and have thus been officially discounted. The
common term used to designate them is ashwaÃiyat (haphazard), which stresses
the absence of planning and organisation and their lack of integration into the
wider community. However, this characterisation is belied by the few available
studies. In terms of organisation and spatial arrangements, the communities ac-
tually tend to show a degree of planning, and a utilitarian approach to the space.
As for their relationship to the state, we can find dynamics of both engage-
ment and disengagement. It is their positioning in relation to the wider society
which is more complex. As noted, these communities tend to exist in relative
separation, as a result of the physical characteristics of the space and their lack
of integration into the main municipal road system. However, in their pursuit
of a living, the residents have established familial and market-linked networks
which extend beyond their communities. In this, they are not very different
from the old popular quarters. In fact, many of the residents of the old quarters
have moved to informal housing areas. Some were even at the forefront of the
original establishment of informal communities, after their former homes col-
lapsed or had to be evacuated.63 According to Eric Denis, these neighbourhoods
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are “veritable cities, popular districts with commerce, markets, and a multitude
of private services that make up for the absence of the state and its schools, clin-
ics and bus lines. It is here that one now finds the people of Cairo.”64
The conventional view is that the popular classes are apathetic, and that if
they engage in action, it is only as a result of their social frustration or the ma-
nipulation of their religiosity. Yet a closer look at the strategies of community
development and consolidation pursued by these classes tells a different story.
In strategies of engagement and disengagement, they developed practices
which challenge state authority. Through community organisation and the es-
tablishment of informal networks, the groundwork for autonomy was laid. Part
of my contention is that Islamist activism should be placed within a broader so-
cial context, which takes account of the different forms of social and spatial or-
ganisation that have come about with the socio-economic changes of the cur-
rent juncture. Islamism is not a marginal religious or political movement or
merely a militant ideology with few adherents. Rather, it is a form of contesta-
tion that finds ground in spaces where oppositional positioning develops. An-
dré Raymond has observed that while popular quarters and classes seem to
erupt onto the scene in historical periods of crises, the conditions for such erup-
tion are rooted in modes of social and territorial organisation. This observation
has relevance to the contemporary context. Indeed, militant Islamism should
not be viewed as the activism of a marginal and alienated group, but rather
through the prism of the social geography and the urban landscape in which it
has taken root. The Islamists anchor themselves in oppositional spaces already
formed or in the process of formation. The terms of this opposition are spatial,
social, cultural, economic, and political. As noted by Denis, these neighbour-
hoods “propose a reformulation of the popular city, recovering the social role
of the street.”65 The dynamics of Islamist insertion into this setting and the log-
ic of their action are factors which influence their ability to direct popular ac-
tivism and its eruption onto the urban scene.
islamist implantation in the new popular quarters
As noted above, the presence of militant Islamist groups in peripheral areas of
the city dates to the early period of activism in the 1970s. However, a crystal-
lisation took place in the 1980s. An important factor in the consolidation of 
Islamists within the informal housing communities was al-JamaÄa al-IslamiyaÃs
decision to migrate to Cairo from Upper Egypt, in response to increased pres-
sures from the state security services and confrontations with the police. Their
destination, in most cases, was the informal housing areas. Ain Shams and 
Imbaba were favoured because of their characteristics, as noted above: peri-
pheral location and a degree of invisibility. Ain Shams is located on the north-
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eastern edge of Cairo. Imbaba is situated in north Giza, falling within the
boundaries of greater Cairo. These two areas are not necessarily peripheral in
terms of their geographical distance from the centre, but in terms of their lack
of integration into the main road and transport systems and the social services
network. For example, as late as 1993, Munira in Imbaba was accessed by an
informal network of unlicensed vans. Its main thoroughfare was unpaved and
visitors had to negotiate their way over old railroad tracks and barbed wire in
order to enter the area. In the late 1980s, Ain Shams had only two paved roads.
Imbaba was originally an agricultural urban fringe which, under the indus-
trialisation policies of President Nasser, saw the establishment of factories ac-
companied by some popular housing construction. Migrants to the city flocked
to the area, where contractors put up cheap housing units. This early associa-
tion with an industrial base accounted for the spread of socialist ideas and ac-
tivism in the 1960s and 70s. The area’s potential as a locus of protest is borne
out by the fact that it was one of the first places where the bread riots broke out
in 1977.66
The JamaÄa found in these spaces an appropriate territory for mobilisation
and action. Their organised implantation in Imbaba began in the mid-1980s,
when a small cell under the direction of RifaÄi Ahmad Taha, a leading member
now residing outside Egypt, met with a number of residents and formed the
group’s nucleus. This nucleus was composed of young migrants of Upper Egypt
origin.67 Through religious education, they managed to recruit more youths. An
aspect of the JamaÄa’s attraction was its confrontational stand vis-à-vis the gov-
ernment, a stand which distinguishes it from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).
According to a leading member, the youths rejected the MB’s soft position.
Here we have a clue to the youths’ preference.68 Occupying a position of con-
flict and confrontation with the state was more appealing. It was not the reli-
gious ideas per se that were at issue, but the practical conclusions drawn from
them, more specifically the positions of resistance they made available.
As part of this organisation, the JamaÄa sent a speaker and representative to
Imbaba, and divided the area into ten main sections, positioning emirs in the
main streets and alleys and in the mosques.69 Following conventional JamaÄa
strategy, new recruits were given religious education in mosques or zawiya (a
small mosque or prayer room); the lessons were given by the local emir and
outsiders were easily identified.70 The JamaÄa controlled five mosques in the
main streets of Munira, giving them access to many of the worshipers. The
mosques were sites from which they could control the main streets, as well. As
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part of their ideological and political consolidation, the JamaÄa used videocas-
settes, journals, and weekly popular meetings to disseminate their views. For
instance, it has been reported that at least one of these meetings attracted six
hundred attendees.71 Gatherings spilled over into the street, and thus were vis-
ible to non-participating residents. The weekly speeches were broadcast over
microphones and heard beyond the vicinity of the mosque and the main street.
The JamaÄa succeeded in attaining a visible presence where the state and its
agents were absent.
Moreover, the group provided social services through a “social work com-
mittee.” The committee helped poor residents with health care and education,
setting up projects that included support for orphaned students, and the distri-
bution of books and food.72 Money was raised from merchants in the market,
a practice which was classified as zakat (alms collection) by the group, but as
itawat (protection money) by its opponents. In addition, the JamaÄa was active
in the area of social relations, enforcing social mores and regulating gender re-
lations. In resolving disputes among the residents, the emir bypassed the tradi-
tional tribal council, whose powers were waning in the face of spreading
anomie and drug abuse.73
Asimilar mode of implantation took place in Ain Shams, where JamaÄa mem-
bers exercised wide-ranging powers over some of the districts and neighbour-
hoods (e.g., Alf Maskan, al-Zahra and Masakin Ain Shams). There are some in-
dications that this implantation involved modes of planning parallel to those
undertaken in Imbaba. For example, directives were given to place Safwat Abd
al-Ghani, a JamaÄa military strategist and a prominent figure of the Jihadist cur-
rent, in the Adam mosque.74 Another important figure, Hasan al-Gharabawi,
was relocated there by the Shura Council in Asyut. Al-JamaÄa controlled a 
number of mosques, namely Adam, Fatima al-ZahraÃ and al-Anwar al-
Muhammadiya. Weekly seminars were held in the Adam mosque. JamaÄa mem-
bers exacted donations from the merchants in the Ibrahim Abd al-Raziq mar-
ket, where they were actively propagating their ideas. These funds were used
to finance the social work committee which operated from the mosque. In ad-
dition to preaching and providing social services, the JamaÄa attended to mat-
ters of social mores—forbidding mixing between the sexes, banning music, and
monitoring entry into the area. It enforced the rules and applied the hudud (re-
ligious ordinances).
In each of the above cases, the group came into conflict with the state. The
immediate causes for this confrontation differ, and reports tend to conflict.
However, it was official cognisance of the growing Islamist challenge which
brought the state to act. The police took action in Ain Shams in 1988. It pene-
trated the area by force, cleared the market and set up roadblocks in the streets
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and alleys, as well as checkpoints at the main entrances to some of the neigh-
bourhoods. Demonstrations ensued and people marched on two police stations
and set them on fire. They also burned police security cars. Islamists and their
supporters blockaded themselves in the mosque and were besieged by the po-
lice. The clashes lasted four days, ending with hundreds of arrests. The gov-
ernment was again moved to act in 1992, in the face of local and international
media reports claiming that Imbaba had fallen under Islamist control. Thou-
sands of police personnel were brought in to “recapture” the territory. The
clashes lasted for three weeks. Following this incident, the government inten-
sified the politics of security, opening access roads to the area and lighting the
streets. It also embarked on a project of upgrading for some areas and planned
removal for others. The implementation of the new policies has been gradual,
and it is too early to determine the outcome.
the popular movement dimensions of contemporary
militant islamism
Earlier studies of the first militant groups elaborated an ideal type of the Islamist
militant: a university student or young graduate, usually in one of the engi-
neering or medical faculties, and of rural origin. According to Saad Eddine
Ibrahim’s work on the 1970s generation of Islamists, the typical militant was a
high achiever. More recently, Ibrahim has found that the “ailment” of the high
achiever has spread to “younger and less educated Egyptians.”75 Alienation, dep-
rivation, and discontent are components of what he terms the “inner sociologi-
cal logic” of Islamist activism. As noted above, however, it is more helpful to
approach militant Islamism in terms of its social rootedness, rather than in terms
of uprootedness. This requires a more differentiated account of the ties that bind
the militants to their social context. I will turn to this account below.
Increasingly, the militants include artisans or hiraffiyin (tradespeople). This
is confirmed by data drawn from police case files pertaining to a 1986 investi-
gation of some members of al-Najun min al-Nar and al-Samawiya, to the ar-
rests made in the Ain Shams events in 1988, and to those members of the new
Jihad-TalaiÄ al-Fatih group who were brought up on charges in 1993. The oc-
cupational profile of the Samawiya group, based on the list of seventy-six ac-
cused and brought to trial, is as follows: twenty-nine technical workers in the
service industry (including three owners of workshops); eleven students in vo-
cational training schools and high schools; three cab drivers; two traders; two
mosque keepers; one farmer; a popular singer; twelve university graduates (of
whom three were teachers, two engineers, one doctor, and the remaining six in
accountancy and clerical jobs); six university students; three enlisted in the
army, for whom no educational background was specified. The occupations of
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six others were not indicated.76 For al-Najun min al-Nar, the list of thirty-three
accused are grouped into the following occupational categories: sixteen pro-
fessionals; ten craftsmen; two traders; two unemployed; one student; two un-
known.77 The list of the accused in the Ain Shams events shows a very similar
breakdown.78 Among the first group of TalaiÄ al-Fatih members to be arrested,
totalling fifty-two individuals, a similar pattern emerged, with many having vo-
cational training and working in trades, particularly housepainting and petty
trading. There were also some students among their number.79
In terms of age composition, this new generation of Islamists maintains the
youthfulness of its predecessor. Looking at the age breakdown of the members
in the cases examined above, it is found that seventy-five percent of activists
were below the age of thirty and that only twenty-five percent are thirty or
above.80 Data regarding the marital status of activists is sketchy. The question
raised here is whether militancy is more prevalent among a particular group,
namely single young men with little familial responsibilities and more mobili-
ty. The predominance of younger members would confirm the association of
activism and youth.81 However, it should be noted that a number of the emirs
were married and had children, and that the wives were engaged in support ac-
tivities, such as hiding weapons. There is a degree of intermarriage among
group members. Activists arrange for their sisters to marry fellow members,
thus forging a bond as brothers-in-law. Sisters also introduce female friends to
their brothers as suitable marriage partners.82 Membership in the JamaÄa is
viewed as a means of securing a partner and gaining financial support for the
marriage. At the same time, established marriage links aim to solidify the rela-
tionships among group members.
As noted earlier, the apparent absence of Islamist mobilisation among the
working class (al-Äumal) can be explained in terms of the form of incorporation
that has characterised the latter’s relation to the state in the post-revolution pe-
riod. Within the state corporatist arrangements framing the workers’ activism,
protest became focused on sit-ins and strikes, which usually ended in negotiated
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rett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics and Religious Transformation in Egypt (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 170.
82 In one militant cell, the emir, Adel Siyam, married Hayam Abd al-Alim, sister of Ahmad and
Muhammad Abd al-Alim, two male activists. It was Hayam’s brother Muhammad who arranged
the marriage. Muhammad’s own marriage to Huriya Abd al-Satar was arranged by his other sister,
Amal. Al-Ahram, 18 June 1994.
settlements.83 Workers’ demonstrations have taken place around the areas of
work and, again, the unions have acted as intermediaries to avoid long drawn
out standoffs. The established working class’s oppositional tactics have inten-
sified in the 1990s in response to liberalisation and privatisation policies.84 The
militant Islamist ideological discourse does not seem to address itself to this sit-
uation. However, we cannot generalise that there are no workers among the Is-
lamists, nor that there is an inherent animosity between the working class and
Islamist activists. It should be recalled that the Muslim Brotherhood was active
in working class areas in the late 1930s, and by the mid-1940s, it carried out an
organisational campaign among the workers of Shubra al-Khayma.85 The ide-
ological principles of the Brotherhood, which were framed in moral and cul-
tural terms, had their appeal under conditions of colonialism and the foreign
ownership of industries. However, these principles became less salient with the
Egyptianisation of industry and the subsequent move to “corporatist national-
ism” in the 1950s.86 At the ideological level, the discourse of today’s militants
suffers similar limitations on its ability to appeal to the workers. Nonetheless,
there are cases of militant Islamist activism among the workers in some of the
industrial areas of Upper Egypt, namely NajÄ Hamadi and Dishna.87
Militant Islamist operations carried out in Cairo in the 1990s were directed
internally by hirafiyyin: emirs in many of the areas were also tradesmen.
Among the emirs of the JamaÄa, we find an electrician (Shaykh Jabir of the Im-
baba group), and a law student/poultry merchant (Gharabawi of Ain Shams).
In addition, tradesmen were the targets of religious lessons held in militant-run
mosques in the popular neighbourhoods of Alexandria.88 In sum, those making
up this social force tend to have a high school level technical education, be en-
gaged in petty trade, and employed in a wide range of jobs in the service and
construction industries: as mechanics, house painters, plumbers, and carpen-
ters.89 Members of some of the Islamist groups tend to reject government em-
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occupational distribution puts the total percentage of professionals at 26.2 percent, students 25
ployment on a matter of principle, in favour of self-employment. They set up
businesses and establish job networks as part of their strategies.90 Hence, their
responses are not different from others in the popular classes, who recognise
that there are no jobs to be had in the government.
Most of these newly-created jobs are held in the informal economy. In urban
areas, informal jobs and informal housing go together. More than half of the
workers in the informal sector live in informal housing communities, especial-
ly Ain Shams, Imbaba, Boulaq, Matarya, and Haram.91 Within this sector are
found unregistered, small businesses which employ less than ten persons. Many
of the jobs involve menial labour. In 1985, it was estimated that there were
2,887,000 jobs in the informal sectors of production, commerce and services.92
In her study of a popular quarter in old Cairo, Singerman confirms the perva-
siveness of informal economic activity, which constituted a primary source of
income for thirty-eight percent of the economically active members of her sam-
ple, and a supplementary source of income for sixty percent.93 Further, pro-
duction workers were heavily represented in this type of activity, most being
hirafiyyin working in small manufacturing workshops.94 These informal eco-
nomic activities depend on occupational and familial networks. Islamists are
part of this socioeconomic configuration. The importance of informal networks
as “avenues of participation” and quiet resistance has been demonstrated in re-
cent studies, which note the activism in survival strategies and networks of rec-
iprocity among the popular classes.95 To this picture should be added the open
resistance and militant oppositional potential which contemporary Islamism
can and does capture.
In occupational and residential terms, the Islamists are located among the
popular classes in the new popular quarters. The views of the JamaÄa members
in these areas are shaped by lessons in the zawiya and by popular religious ed-
ucation through cassettes and the sermons of popular preachers. They attend
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91 Mostafa Kharoufi, “The Informal Dimension of Urban Activity in Egypt: Some Recent
Work,” in Informal Sector in Egypt, ed. Nicholas Hopkins, Cairo Papers in the Social Sciences
(Winter 1991), 8–20.
92 The figure is provided by Nader Fergany, and is quoted in Soad Kamil Rizq, “The Structure
and Operation of the Informal Sector in Egypt,” in Employment and Structural Adjustment: Egypt
in the 1990s, eds. Heba Handoussa and G. Potter (Cairo: The American University Press, 1991),
167–85.
93 Singerman, Avenues of Participation, 178. 94 Ibid., 187.
95 Ibid.
weekly seminars that include religious speeches and updates on JamaÄa activities
and news of Muslims in other countries. Thus, we witness a shift in terms of
membership and location of recruitment and means of organisation. Islamist ac-
tivism has moved from the university to the neighbourhood. However, the
mosque and religious education remain central.96
In attempts to avoid police surveillance, residential flats have come to serve
as new gathering-places.97 Direct access to followers is possible through the
use of video-senders, whereby the JamaÄa is able to broadcast certain video-
tapes directly into the homes of members and sympathisers.98 To tune in, view-
ers are notified in advance of the transmission times of this alternative pro-
gramming. In addition to juristic pamphlets, political newsletters and bulletins
are now used.99 These analyse sociopolitical and economic conditions and deal
directly with the people’s difficulties, tackling issues such as increases in bread
prices, government investment policies, and so on. Thus, “educational” activi-
ties pay greater attention to issues of daily concern, and address questions of
exploitation and oppression. There has also been a marked shift in focus away
from the problem of the infidel ruler to that of official corruption.100
My emphasis on occupational and residential factors aims to highlight the lo-
cation of Islamism within a particular urban context, which shows the move-
ment’s popular dimensions. Thus, the analysis nuances earlier views which
pointed to its elitist-vanguardist nature, evidenced in social background vari-
ables and the groups’ approach to state and society. In both Ain Shams and Im-
baba, the Islamists have engaged with the people. As noted above, they resolved
disputes among neighbours, and provided social services and religious teaching.
Many of the members come from families that know each other and are tied by
kin relations. This provides the groups with familial, popular protection, which
is vital to their capacity to confront and resist the authorities. Reports indicate
that while committed members in Ain Shams numbered in the hundreds, the
number of sympathisers who could be mobilised reached into the thousands.101
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My exposé indicates that there have been significant transformations in the
social makeup of the militants and in their engagement with society. Howev-
er, elements of elitism or distance from society continue to exist in their ide-
ology and practice. This may be attributed in part to the fact that the intellec-
tual leadership seems to remain with the first generation or historic leadership
and its disciples,102 many of whom are either in prison or residing abroad. A
more important factor, which I have noted in my earlier work and which is
consistent with the late Hisham Mubarak’s assessment, is the ideological lim-
itation of the Islamists’ capacity to engage in popular action. Such constraints
derive from the group’s emphasis on the principle of al-amr bil maÄruf wa al-
nahy an al-munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil). In some respects,
the application of this principle recalls popular practices of social control and
is thus acceptable. However, it also expresses an attitude of intolerance which
contradicts popular norms of toleration and moderation. I will discuss this
problem briefly.
Certain acts of violence carried out by the Islamists are directed against what
they see as violations of public morality. Under the rubric of al-amr bil maÄruf
wa al nahy an al-munkar, they commit acts of social violence directed against
fellow citizens, including organised attacks on video clubs, cinemas and liquor
stores. Other acts aim at enforcing an adherence to moral strictures usually re-
lating to interaction between the sexes, the dress code and popular entertain-
ment at weddings and during festive occasions. It is in these areas that the am-
biguity lies. In challenging state and society, the Islamists often invoke popular
traditions of male-dominated interaction between the sexes and family rela-
tions. Popular traditions thus serve as a frame of reference for contestation. As
an oppositional strategy, this involves the merging of popular values with Is-
lamic traditions. An example of such merging is the overlap of Äayb (shame)
and haram (illicit) in the popular imagination. ÄAyb is a principle of social con-
trol that is applied to many spheres and relationships, particularly family and
gender relations, while haram is a principle stipulating religious restrictions. 
In practice, these principles fade into one another. The Islamists’ concern with
social mores in terms of halal and haram (licit and illicit) intertwines with the
Äayb tradition.103 Their ideas of gender segregation draw on horma (sanctity)
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regulations concerning the inviolability of women and the spaces with which
women are conventionally associated. Historically, these regulations were en-
forced in the hara, which Islamist action, in the present, seeks to reinscribe in
the new neighbourhoods. It should be noted that the housing conditions in some
dwellings have served to undermine these regulations. The crowding of male
and female family members in a single-room dwelling, and of whole families
into shared accommodations transgresses the norms. Popular concerns with
such issues have been expressed in questions directed to the Lajnat al-Fatwa
(Religious Ruling Committee) of al-Azhar.104
Tahakum (arbitration to God) is a central idea in the Jihadist ideology and
constitutes another area where the normatively grounded attitudes and practices
of the quarter can be merged with Islamic principles. Past and present popular
quarters have a tradition of arbitration, in which disputants turn to respected
members of the neighbourhood as referees. The JamaÄa has stepped forward to
occupy this role. Islamists have inscribed themselves in the space as mediators
or agents of tahakum, to whom conflicting groups refer in order to sort out dis-
agreements.105 The offices of the JamaÄa have reconciled disputing spouses, re-
instated a son’s financial obligations to his mother, settled outstanding debts,
and so on.106 The intensity of the JamaÄa’s involvement in social relations can-
not be fully established from available data. However, what needs to be stressed
is the symmetry between their modes of operation and popular avenues of so-
cial regulation in particular spheres. Here, the JamaÄa and the people converge
in eschewing the involvement of public authority.
In a sense, the JamaÄa members occupy a multitude of roles, ranging from
the futuwwa to the shaykh al-hara. Like the shaykh al-hara they control the
boundaries of the community, monitoring entrances and identifying insiders
from outsiders. Many of the practices recall traditional futuwwah acts.107 In
dealing with violations of the moral code, the JamaÄa issued warnings. For 
instance, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the JamaÄa dealt with violations
of the moral code by issuing warnings to the “violators” and calling them to
the mosque for disciplinary meetings. The emir or the group instructed trans-
gressors on correct practice and advised reform. Failure to comply was met
with punishment which included beating and flogging. JamaÄa members ap-
propriate the role of protecting women and safeguarding their sharaf (chastity).
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In imposing control in the home, the JamaÄa seemed to operate a system of
surveillance which allowed it to detect illicit relations between men and
women in the neighbourhood.108 In Ain Shams, alleged illicit conduct was
punished by public flogging. In Imbaba, the JamaÄa attacked flats where “im-
moral” acts were reputed to be taking place and charges were made against
the inhabitants. Furthermore, there are reports of neighbourhood fights be-
tween Islamist activists and coffee shop and video-club proprietors.109 These
events indicate not only that a different lifestyle was pursued by some of the
residents, but also that those who differed were not easily deterred by the
JamaÄa’s practices.
The JamaÄa members’ interventions extend to economic activities and other
types of social relations: they oversee market activities, and engage in neigh-
bourhood brawls in their role as mediators and arbiters. It should be recalled
that the various futuwwa practices lie on a continuum from protective, integra-
tive functions at one extreme, to the destabilising, disintegrative activities as-
sociated with the gang leader—the baltagi (thug) type—at the other.110 Ac-
cording to some commentators, Shaykh Jabir, the Imbaba emir, was a baltagi
and not a religious leader.111 There is an ambiguity in the role of the defender-
protector who uses bullying and intimidation—popular acceptance of this 
behaviour takes into account the level of violence used and the goals being 
pursued. In these roles, we see the practices of the old quarters reappearing.
However, there are limits to the Islamists’ success in redefining popular prac-
tices. The extremism in tone and action which tends to accompany the Is-
lamists’assumption of these roles contradicts the no-fuss spirit of awlad al-bal-
ad (sons of the country), resulting in a loss of popular support for the JamaÄa.112
Thus, the dynamics of their popular insertion are more complex than they ap-
pear at first sight.
Islamists anchor themselves in spaces which, because of their characteristics
of autonomy, informality and self-regulation, are open to oppositional activities.
Islamists are thus enmeshed in the web of social relations found in these areas.
They may have a program of change, but they are likely to lose ground if they
push too far on certain issues. There are rules governing their reciprocal rela-
tions with the communities. As participants in familial, economic, and religious
networks they gain community support for their activities in facing the govern-
ment. Yet their use of force to apply a strict or puritanical code contradicts  pop-
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ular norms of tolerance and moderation. In support of the first proposition, I draw
on the facts surrounding cases of confrontation with the state. In Ain Shams, the
JamaÄa relied on familial networks to supply the numbers needed for the demon-
strations that followed the August and December 1988 standoffs with the police.
It has been reported that the December conflict started as a dispute between sev-
eral vendors and a single police officer which escalated when the police used
this as a pretext to regain control of the area, thereby drawing in the JamaÄa.
Thus, the Islamists’ involvement overlaps with popular antagonism towards au-
thority. In Imbaba, neighbourhood youths of the futuwwa type joined the JamaÄa
and provided the needed muscle in clashes with the police in 1992.
This pattern of clashes is also found in other instances of social violence
which do not involve the JamaÄa. A recent study of violence in Egypt between
1967 and 1992 shows that popular riots and demonstrations often begin as con-
flicts with the police. In these cases, police mistreatment of citizens tends to
spark off urban riots, in which the residents of the victim’s neighbourhood are
mobilised. They usually march on the police station involved and clash with the
officers. Such incidents have occurred in popular quarters such as Sayyida 
Zaynab, Ataba and al-Madabigh. The crowd is often composed mainly of hi-
rafiyyin (plumbers, bakers, and construction workers, for example).113 Popular
resentment towards the police is undoubtedly intensifying, as police brutality
has become the norm. A standard repertoire of urban unrest appears to be de-
veloping: street clashes with the police in response to excessive police force
and arbitrary arrestation, followed by marches on the police station and ending
in additional arrests. No doubt, this patterning of relations has resulted in the
transformation of some of Cairo’s police stations into veritable fortresses.114
Strong popular engagement in Islamist clashes with the police are evidenced
in the fact that in both the Imbaba and Ain Shams cases the confrontation ex-
tended over periods of several days to several weeks, and required the deploy-
ment of large numbers of police personnel. The Ain Shams operations were ex-
ecuted in two stages—in August and December of 1988. After gaining control
of the Imbaba territory, a police unit was stationed in the area for some time.
“Combing out” operations continue in these areas, despite the large numbers of
militants arrested. State action against the militants has comprised the repos-
session of the mosques and the closure of the zawiya, in addition to campaigns
aimed at discrediting the militants and undermining their popular appeal. Here
we have clues as to the Islamists’ ability to capture oppositional potential and
channel it into organised social activism beyond what Asef Bayat terms “quiet
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encroachment.”115 According to Bayat, the absence of structures for popular
collective action accounts for the lack of a sustained challenge similar to that
seen in Iran’s shantytown dweller movements. The latter involved intense and
prolonged mobilisation and protests. However, if we take into account the
standoffs in Imbaba and Ain Shams we find that the structures discussed above
provided the bases for widening the Islamists’ conflict with the government to
include greater segments of the population.
There are macrostructural elements which favour popular engagement in
support of the Islamists. These do not arise out of alienation and uprootedness,
but out of the new dynamics of state-society relations. It should be recalled that
formal political organisations are ineffective in representing or mobilising the
people. The social/moral contract between the people and the state of the
Nasserist period has weakened, if not dissolved. The deal organised around 
the suspension of citizens’ political rights in exchange for social rights is no
longer operative. Today, there is little in the way of social benefit coming from
the state. Increasingly, the people have to depend on their own resources, and
a gradual process of disengagement is taking place. The corporatist structures
are being dismantled, and with them the people’s side of the bargain. 
Before further examining the limitations on the JamaÄa’s ability to transform
itself into a full-fledged popular movement, I would like to underline the ele-
ments of organisation which can help it do so. The JamaÄa operates as a trans-
neighbourhood group through a network of mosques and flats, particularly in
the new quarters and some of the old quarters. In the records from the Jihad tri-
al, we find that potential recruits were taken from their neighbourhood mosques
to attend mosques in other neighbourhoods, in order to hear the emir/preacher.
There are also indications that a level of coordination exists among the differ-
ent neighbourhood cells of the JamaÄa. The active members enjoy a degree of
mobility, and are able to relocate from one neighbourhood to another with the
help of other JamaÄa members. These elements of their organisational structure
are important for any attempt to establish a citywide popular movement.116
However, the group experiences both internal, ideological and, by extension,
operational,constraints, and external constraints that come with the govern-
ment’s policy of encirclement.
If the advocacy of anti-government violence is a source of attraction for the
youths, the policy of social violence detracts from their ability to reach wider
segments of the population. The popular cultural practice of providing satr
(protection or cover) to an errant member of the community is a factor in ap-
proaching social and religious transgressions in a discrete manner. Peaceful 
avenues of conflict resolution emerge out of a desire to avoid division and the 
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entrenchment of animosities. Thus, the JamaÄa’s public flogging of violators 
denies them satr and brings shame on individuals and their families.117 Re-
strictions on listening to music and celebrating weddings are likely to be viewed
as intolerant. The resilience of peaceful modes for regulating moral violations
appears at this stage as a factor in making militant Islamism less appealing. Fi-
nally, the extreme violence which characterises the attacks on tourists and Copts
in the last few years, and particularly the Luxor massacre, have brought shock
and condemnation from all sectors of society.118
The question of violence implied in the jihad principle may, in the end, rep-
resent what Gehad Auda sees as a paradox for the militants.119 Their advocacy
of exercising jihad to change un-Islamic practices has involved dispersed vio-
lent action, which lacks direction and brings chaos. In principle, anyone can en-
gage in jihad, and this wrests control away from the hands of the leadership.
The lawlessness of this type of situation, as noted above, is not always con-
strained by popular norms, because some Islamist principles clash with these
norms. Finally, we should note the state’s involvement in discrediting these acts
as un-Islamic. State Äulama have mobilised on a number of occasions to show
the deviation of the militants from the “true” understanding of religion. Further,
the government is pursuing a policy of cultural Islamisation through religious
television programs and newspapers. This constitutes an attempt at construct-
ing an alternative Islamic view—one focused on rituals and appearances.120
The question of whether this type of Islamisation would marginalise the mili-
tants or serve to reinforce their ranks is contingent on how the various forces
involved position themselves in response.
towards a conclusion: is militant islamism a protest
movement of the popular classes?
This paper has attempted to show the popular dimensions of contemporary Is-
lamism by underlining the socio-spatial determinants at work. It highlights the
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spatial grounding of Islamism in the urban setting and points to a transforma-
tion in the social composition of the membership. The occupational profile of
the members testifies to the particular socioeconomic setting from which they
are drawn, and the particular social relations and networks within which they
operate. These factors support the argument for the popular dimensions of the
movement. In fact, the Islamist mode of action has responded to these deter-
minants; moving into neighbourhoods, basing themselves in mosques, zawiyas,
and flats, and engaging in social work and awareness-raising activities. These
popular dimensions are undermined by an element of ideological practice, that
of al-amr bil maÄruf wa al-nahy an al-munkar, which, in certain respects, merges
with popular traditions, while contradicting them in others. The emerging pic-
ture is that the JamaÄa members are neither uprooted nor alienated. They are
part of the social fabric. They may pull it in extreme directions, but they are wo-
ven within it. The use of violence to oppose the government or undermine its
respectability gives vent to popular grievances, but extreme violence is likely
to appear senseless.
The mobilisational potential of militant Islamism seems to lie in its ability to
ground its ideological principles in the social antagonisms and the opposition-
al positions that are part of the urban landscape. The Islamists’ activism and ap-
propriation of space recall popular traditional practices and reinscribe histori-
cal modes of social organisation. To this extent, they conform to the people’s
perceptions of authenticity. In order to expand their popular support, they must
operate within the socio-spatial framework of the communities. The Islamists’
insertion into this setting has so far been beset by limitations because of con-
stant government crackdowns and their own limited scope of ideological 
manoeuvrings.
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